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PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
The U.S. Naval War College and the 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force 
UMSDF) have had a long and mutually 
profitable relationship. Since the Naval 
Command College (the course for senior 
officers from other navies) was insti­
tuted by Admiral Arleigh Burke over 25 
years ago, an unbroken chain of Japa­
nese officers has been in attendance. 
The quality of these officers is clearly 
demonstrated by che face chat, of the 25 
graduates, tO date 19 have achieved flag 
rank. We expect more recent graduates 
t0 add co thac most impressive list. 
During a visir tO Japan I made in 
January with a group from the CNO 
Executive Panel on which I serve in an 
ex-officio status, I had an excellent 
opportunity to see first-hand how well 
our Japanese graduates are doing. At a 
dinner hosted by Admiral Maeda, the 
current Chief of Staff (CNO), JMSDF, 
three former CNOs were present: 
Admirals Nakamura (NCC '61); Uchida 
(NCC '63); and Oga (NCC '67). On a 
visit co Yokosuka, we met Vice Admiral 
Hozumi (NCC '71) who currently com­
mands the Yokosuka Naval District and 
his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Okada 
(NCC '75). In Tokyo, I had a pleasant 
reunion over lunch with Captain Takeo 
Fukuchi (NCC '81) and Lieutenant Com­
mander Hideya Shirahaca (Naval Staff 
College '81) and their wives. 
It was an interesting time to visit 
Japan. Two major issues dominate the 
current U.S.-Japanese relationship: the 
lopsided trade situation and the Japa­
nese defense expenditures. 
Japan's trade surplus with the United 
States is expected tO exceed $20 billion 
this year, more than ten percent over 
lase year's surplus of $18 billion. This 
has become a significant political prob­
lem which has generated a great deal of 
pressure in the United Stares co per­
suade Japan to open further its markets 
t0 foreign goods. American charges of 
Japanese protectionism srem nor only 
from tariff barriers but also from non­
cariff problems, such as import testing 
procedures. Japan has now acted t0 
reduce this friction by hastening cuts in 
the existing tariffs and, more recently, 
by revising imporc examination pro­
cedures and their associated paper work 
in 67 areas of complaint by Japan's 
trading partners. A great deal more 
remains to be done if this friction is to 
be attenuated and if growing U.S. Con­
gressional concern over the trade im­
balance is to be satisfied. 
The issue of Japan's defense expendi­
tures is closely allied to che debate over 
the trade surplus. At the end of 1981, 
the Japanese government announced a 
military budget for 1982 of SI 1. 7 billion, 
an increase of 7.75 percent over the 4
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The Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize iJ awarded each year lo the Naval 
War College student author of the euay judi!ed most profeuionally worthy of thore 
submitted in competition fo-r the prize. The 1981 winner argues hef'e that tactical 
nuclear war at .rea it more likely than we wi1h to believe, that hope that political and 
moral inhibitions again.rt crouing the nuclear threshold is a poor deteffent, and that 
the U.S. Navy mu.rt accept the pouibi/;'ty of htlving to fight a nuclear war at sea and 
must, therefore, prepare to win it, 
THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE 
AND THE U.S. NAVY 
by 
Lieutenant Commander T. Wood Parker, U.S. Navy 
ln1rod11ction, Although consider­
able attention has been given to "tacti# 
cal" nuclear warfare by some peop le in 
the U.S. Navy in the last 2 years, the 
Navy remains woefuHy deficient in this 
increasingly importanr area of opera­
tions. To be sure, the Chief of Naval 
Operations has directed the servke co 
improve itself in this direcrion. He has 
established an office in Opnav, Op-65, 
char is direcrly responsible for nuclear 
warfare at seat for appropriate weapons 
development. and for the employmenr 
of those weapons. Additionally, he has 
esrablished a new program mana8er, 
PM-23, in the Naval Material Com­
mand, also responsible for nuclear war­
fare considerations, These e fforts have 
produced an institutional advocacy for 
rhe ability to use nuclear weapons at sea 
and will. in the tong runt prove ro be 
necessary and worthwhile. Further• 
more, rhere are other signs that two 
decades of neglect by the U.S. Navy 
regarding such warfare have ended. For 
example, the current development of a 
nuclear-armed surface-to-air missile ls 
the first tactical nuclear weapon pro­
duced for the U.S. Navy in almost 20
years, and seeps have been taken 
towards development of a meaningful 
doctrine for the employment of nuclear 
weapons at sea, rhough there are prob� 
lems of ambiguity associated with it. 
However, the action taken thus far is 
only scratching the surface of the prob� 
lem. With the exception of the one 
missile, weapons procurement acdons 
seem rocontradicr the attention focused 
on nuclear weapons by rhe CNO. To cire 
an important example, Harpoon is 
limited to a convemional capability, and 
those people who indicare tharrheNavy 
will not deploy nuclear-armed Toma­
hawk are inc reasing in number and 
credibilicy. 1 Furthermore, rhere is little 6
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The United Stater' rhort minelaying ,ampaign off the harborr of North Vietnam 
in 1972 war the oe&arion of two vi&torier. The firrt of there war over the U.S. 
ignorance and fear ar Jo what the SovietI and the Chine re might do if the mines were 
laid, and the recond war over the North Vietnamese, whore military lifeline the 
mines rtrangled. Which victory war the greaser of the two? 
VICTORY OVER IGNORANCE AND FEAR: THE 
U.S. MINELA YING ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM 
by 
Commander (Senior Grade) Ulrik Luckow, Royal Danish Navy 
The war in Viemam may now be 
described as cypical of a pattern that 
limited wars might follow in the future: 
an ill-defined beginning, an intense 
"hot" phase, and an inconclusive ending. 
The United States made no formal 
declaration of war; there was no all-out 
mobilization of the country's resources 
to support war, or no national political 
consensus ro defeat the enemy decisively 
and force his surrender. The hot phase 
seems to have happened as a conse­
quence of many individual decisions by 
at least three, and some will argue, four 
successive presidents of rhe United 
States. 
The complexity of this war was 
increased by the pronounced effect of 
press attimdes, by the opposition of 
powerful individuals in the Congress, by 
college campus unrest and by disenchant­
ment in Europe with U.S. preoccupation 
with the problems of Southeast Asia. 
Within this setting, the American 
military had, eventually, to plan and 
execute actions needed to solve the 
problem of getting the country out of 
the war. The actions were limited by 
political considerations and the deci­
sions flowing from them. In addition, 
the military was subjected to a degree of 
civilian command and control of strat­
egy, operations, and tactics unique in 
American history. It may be remem­
bered that on several occasions during 
the war President Johnson personally 
approved bombing rargets for air opera­
tions the following day. 
The U.S. Minin11 Campai1n Before 
1972. The Navy's mission was to 
reduce the flow of arms and military 
supplies to North Viemam's armies. 
Throughout the course of the war chis 
aim never changed. However, the 
means used to obtain the result did 
change substantially. 
Most of those arms and supplies were 
foreign-made, the products of the 
U.S.S.R. and China. They entered North 20
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TARNISHED BRASS 
by 
Captain E.L. Cope, U.S. Coast Guard 
A young officer aboard the Coast 
Guard Cutter Afid1:ett said to me 
recently, "I don't know whac they're 
doing different at Training Center 
Alameda 1 bur rhe last four or five sea� 
men apprentices we'vt' gotten have 
been super." 
This triggered the recollection rhat 
several of our 378 Cutter skippers have 
told me the young officers they're 
getting are doing a fomastic job! A light 
came on, and I scurried for a number of 
articles I read lately: 
-"A Military Wichour Mind or Soul" 
by James Fallows, IWa,hinr,ton 
Monthly - Aptil 1981. 
-"Morale Factor. Something very en­
couraging in the way of reenlistments 
has been happening in the Armed 
Forces in recent months," Editorial in 
13 April Wall Street Journal. 
"9 to 5 Soldier -· Civilian Life and a 
Business Ethic are Undermining the 
Volunteer Army" - also James Fal­
lows in 3 May 1981, San Francisco 
Chronicle Examiner. 
Clearly we, the senior offkers and 
chiefs need toacr in order thar rhe young 
people who will follow, the junior offi­
cers and enlisted who happen to be very 
talented observers, Ciln conrinue an 
honored and rewarding tradition of 
service. 
There are three key issues I would like 
ro focus upon: 
• We are ove-rmundged and tmderled
• We don't have u job-u:e haver,
profeuion 
• lt's important that we're differe,Jt
Fir.rt, we are 01,ermanaged and under•
led: 
Not long ago [ heard a very capable 
young lieurenant give a leadership and 
management school overview, He did a 
magnificent job. Following his remarks, 
[ asked rhe question: "What is the 
difference between leadership and 
management?" He said rhereessentially 
is no difference and referred me to the 
dictionary. I went to the dictionary and 
ir states: 
• leadership-The ability to guide
t:he course or direction of, 
• Management-The act of hand­
ling, controlling or directing. 
Thosedefinirions sound similar; how� 
ever, they cause me problems. Not thar 
the management school isn't valuable. 
On the cnnrrary, almost everyone gives 
the school rave reviews. Our young 
31
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Admiral Go-r.rhkov's forthcominf.!, atrcra/t earn.er might prerent uJ snnutime In 
1he future w,-th the :mpltia:!iant .cpeaacle of "a m11.rdt.:bound U.S, carrier /nrce 
outsmarted by a smaller, less capable SrJt-'iet fleet in a '
t
hird \f/orld crhts," /.r such a 
scene posrible? If .ro, how do we prevent it? 
A CAR.HIER FOR ADMIRAL GORSHKOV 
by 
Dov S. Zakheim 
Over forty years ago, Joseph Stalin 
outlined to his senior naval officers his 
ideas for a new and powerful Soviet 
fleet. Among the ships he suggested for 
rhat fleer was the .tiraaf t rarrier, whose 
dominance in naval warfare had yet to 
be established-and, in fan, was nor 
clearly demonstrated until the Battle of 
Midway. Stalin never lived to see his 
hopes fulfilled bur, if Navy testimony 
and inre!ligence reports prove accurate, 
rheSoviet fleet will unveil irs first large, 
fixed-wing aircraft carrier some time 
near the end of this decade. 
Scwiet ships, like American warships, 
emer the fleet only after a very long 
�estation period, But che haH•cenrury 
rhat will have elapsed between Stalin's 
pronoum'ements and rhe1r reaiization 
marks an unusually long span, parrh.:u­
larly given rhe changes in rhe nature of 
naval warfare, indeed all warfare, thut 
have materialized over that period. 
Why, then, has the Soviet Union ap­
parently decided to construct a flxed­
wing carrier? More ro the point, why ar 
this time und with what purpose in 
mind? 
Fathoming.Soviet intentions isa hazard• 
ous effort and often a fruitless one, 
Nevertheless, at a time when the United 
Stares is itself <lerermined nor only m 
halr the decline in its seaborne fire­
power, but also ro expand it, a rou�h 
sense of Soviet imentions may be useful, 
Sho11ld those imentions appear to be 
undergoing some change, U.S. naval 
development would best be served if it 
accoumed for tht'm, as well as for the 
more traditional goals ascribed w Soviet 
naval fon:es in rhe postw:1r period. 
f:nrrierE- and Soviet �a val Df'velop .. 
men!: A Look BaPk. Thar Joseph 
Stalin indicated ro Adm, Nikolai 
Kuznetzov and others in 1937 hi& desire 
co add aircraft carriers to rheSovler fleet 
is less surprising rhan the subsequent 
development of that fleer into one of the 
world's two mosr powerful naval forces 
u.itbout the benefit of the carrier.Soviet
naval leaders, like their lmpedal Rus•
sian predecessors, have always been
keenly aware of foreign technological
developments and often have adapted
chose developments to their own 35
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NEW DIRECTIONS AND NEW PROBLEMS 
FOR ARMS TRANSFERS POLICY 
by 
David J, Louscher and Michael D. Salomon 
The climate for the transfer uf Ameri­
c.rn arms toorher(ountrics has drnnged 
in rhe year since Ron.iid Reng,111 became 
PrcsidenL In the fin-a months of Presi­
dent Cf\rter's term there was a commit­
ment to consrniint. But it was under­
mined by events during the last two 
years of Mr. Carter's Presidency.Just as 
substCTntial obstacles prevented Pre!>iw 
dent Carter from rcsrrnining the sale of 
,urns as much .i.s he would have liked, so 
roo wHI President Reagan confront 
many obsrndes in his plan rn increase 
arms transfers. 
The assumptions of President 
Reagan and his key advisors about the 
role of weaponry for maintaining pea(c 
are different from those held initially by 
Presidenr Caner. Principally, the 
Reagan adminisrrnrion appears com­
mitted ro containment as a major 
foreign policy objective, to the strength­
ening of America's allies, and to a 
greater American pre&cnce throughom 
the world, 
The administration's view of rhe 
value of arms s,dcs to accomplishing 
these objectives is reficncd in rhc rcsd­
mony of Secretary of Srnre Alcxnnder 
Hai,q before the Senate For<.:ign Rch1-
tions Committee. 
As we srrcngrhen these states, 
we strcn,qthcn ourselves, 
.ind , , . we do so more effecrivcly 
and at less cost. Friendly stares can 
help to deter thre;m before they 
escalare inm world shaking crises. 
The issue is nm whether a local 
srate can singlchandedJy resist a 
Soviet assault, Rather, it is whether 
it ran make that assauit more 
costly, morccomplit·ared, nnd there­
fore politically less likely to occur. 1 
The Carter Lf'�aey. President 
Jimmy Carter, convinced that contain­
ment wm, no lonj:;cr a valid basis for the 
conduct of Amerinin foreign policy/ 
was determined to limir the use of arms 
sales as an insrrumem uf policy, He 
43
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ASW: WHERE IS THE INNER SCREEN? 
by 
Commander R.W. Atkins, U.S. :'lavy 
Submarine and antisubmatine forces 
are engaged in a continuing batrle, with 
rechnological advances providing one or 
the other a transient advantage, likely ro 
be offset rapidly by some appropriate 
countec. Two relatively recent such 
advancements are influencing current 
tacticaJ doctrine, 
The firsr is the vast improvemenr in 
passive sonar and assodared processing 
systems. The effective use of these 
systems depends both on their being 
where acoustic condirions are favorable 
and on rhe opposing submarines being 
noisy enough to be identified from 
among competing sea noises, If neither 
condition exists, rhe passive sys rem will 
nor detect the submarine. The likeli� 
hood of detection can be influenced 
favorably by appropriate stationing of 
ASW platforms and placement of sen­
sors ro minimize acoustic interference 
and to rake advantage o( phenomena 
such as convergence zones, 
To counter rhe improvements in 
passive detection, submarine design 
undergoes constant review and modifi­
cation aimed at quiering the boars. 
When quiering programs succeed io 
producing submarines capable of con� 
ducting normal operations at noise 
levels below rhose found in the ocean, 
passive acoustic detection will have 
been put om of business. 
A second techno!ogicaJ advance m 
influence rnnical doctrine is the coming 
of tactical missiles hmnched from sub� 
merged submi1rines. At first glance it 
appears fortunate for b1nrle group 
planners chat stationing requirements 
fot the optimum use of passive ASW 
surface pfatforms closely parallel those 
required for defense against submarine� 
launched tactkal missiles. Indeed, cur­
rent doctrine and procedures are 
adequate fot the prosecution of subma­
rine cont11cts developed in the passive 
search areas. Once rhe submarine has 
launched a missile, battle group doctrine 
propetly views rhe problem as a matter 
of AAW. 
But there is a flaw in this neat picture, 
stemming from our emphasis on the use 
of passive systems for rhe detection of 
submarines. Typical battle group forma� 
tions place the ASW platforms well our 
of visual range of main body ships, 
positioned to optimize their passive 
acoustic sensors. The 10-15 mile radius 
surrounding the main body is ofren left 
unprotected and unsearched. Various 
rationales are used to explain this slcua­
cion, among them dlspersir)O for decep­
tion, attempts tO create targeting prob� 
lemsi reduction of acoustic interference, 
and reduced force levels. 
No matter rhe cause, the focc remains 
that main body ships are generally 
51
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PROTECTING THE CARRIER AGAINST 
TORPEDO ATTACK 
by 
Lieutenant Commander Jamee G. O'Keefe, t:.S. Navy 
and 
Lieutenant Commander David L. Hallenbeek, U.S. Navy 
The prospect o( torpedo attack 
against our high.value units periodically 
rears irs ugly head and then submerges 
again as technology and tacrics are 
deveJopcd ro counter this threat, In our 
century's wars each m,1jor chrcar to the 
high-value unit was analyzed and dealt 
with after a few (or in some cases, a lot) 
of important ships were sunk in almost 
every case the most efficient and cost­
effective mechanism used to attack these 
ships was a torpedo. 
The speed and sophist1carion of 
present-day torpedoes greatly enhance 
the already formidable capabilities of 
modern submarines, Advances in guid­
ance systems, internal logic capabilities, 
and propulsion efficiencies expand the 
fire-concrol solutions .ivailable to the 
submarine commander for beyond whut 
was pracrka! in past wars. 
The speed and endurance of modern 
submarines make rhe task of detecting 
rhem much more difficult rha.n it was in 
rhe past; but j with the advenr of 
helicopters carrying a pracdcal dipping 
sonar in the !arc 1950s and early 1960s, 
nominal parity in acquisition and 
defense was achieved. However, in 
recenr years as the emphasis has shifted 
away from torpedo arrack and focused 
on missiles fired from dlstant subma­
rines, the hclos available to the battle 
group commander have been allowed to 
decline from 16 SH-3s on board a CVS 
to 8 in a squadron aboard a CV A to the 
present 6 per squadron that deploys on a 
CV. This leaves the battle group <:om­
mander almost impotent to protect his
force against dose-in torpedo atrack.
While the other air ASW assets have 
grown apace, the dose-in capability of 
the carcier m protect herself has been, 
and still is, dependent upon the active 
dipping sonars of rhe old SH-3s, for the 
ambient noise levels and processing 
time constraints wirhin 10,000 yards of 
rhe carrier preclude that passive prosecu­
tion normally conducted by those S-3s, 
P-3s, or SH-Zs which might beon hand,
These aircraft are further hampered
from dose-in prosecution by the alritude
restricrions imposed by rhe carrier's
ongoing flight operations, SH-2s are
also restricted by their lack of modern
processing capability and rheir lack of a
dipping sonar,
The grear attention focused on the 
AA W problem is obviously necessary 
due to rhe increased Soviet capability to 
launch shorr- to medium-range amiship 
missiles from a growing number of 
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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOUTHERN 
SEA ROUTE 
by 
Lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, U.S. Navy 
At least since 1946 1 there has been a 
strong, persistent impression in rhe 
United States that the keys ro under­
standing Soviet interests in Southwest 
Asia are linked to oil and the ability to 
regulate or deny that oil ro other 
nations. 1 The Russians also are widely 
held to be intent on acqui ring a warm• 
water port, that is, a year-around port, 
on the Indian Ocean, These perceptions 
have been sharpened recently by the 
findings of certain U.S. government 
agencies that the lJ,S,S.lt is running 
short on oil and perhaps as soon as 198'.> 
could become a net importer, by the fall 
of the imperial governmem of Iran in 
early 1979, and by the U.S.S.R.'s military 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979. These events have caused major 
changes in U.S. policy , strategy, and 
military organization relative to South­
west Asia. A shurp rise in U$, nutional 
interest in the greater Persian Gulf area 
has been conditioned by both our 
increased dependence o n  foreign 
sources of petroleum and the vast in­
crease in its cost, 
In the 1970s, rhe U,S.S.R. was the 
world's largest producer of oil. Most 
of the oil it ekports goes to the 
Eastern European communist countries ) 
while the U.S.S.R.'s own rate of 
consumption is less than half that 
of the United States. Accordingly 1 
Soviet of icials and commentators 
characterize Western references to any 
imminent oil shortages in their country 
as "myths." Indeed, even U.S. official 
and private agencies are sharply divided 
as to whether the U,S,S.R. is running 
short of oil for its own and friendly 
foreign consumption or even if it wili in 
this century. 
The basic conditions of the Soviet 
Union's economy are that it is insulated 
from the direct effects of supply and 
demand and that it tends to be self­
sufficient Neitherof these fundamental 
conditions suggests an inclination to 
rely heavily on foreign sources of so 
critical a resource as oil. Nor does the 
U.S.S.R. appear to have begun the long­
term channel development which 
would make it possible for large, deep­
draft cankers bearing large quantiries of 
oil to enter Soviet porrs, Other jndi­
cators would be the construction of 
extensive, specialized port and pipeline 
facilities for importation; there are no 
such indicators. 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
Mersky, Peter B. and Folmar, Norman. 
The Naval Air War in Vietnam. 
Annapolis, Md.: Nautical and Avia­
tion Publishing Company of America, 
198L 224pp. $17.95 
The Vietnam war has ofren been 
described as an undertaking ''long on 
sorrow and short on glory," In retro­
spect, lr seems that what glory rhere was 
in this difficult conflict often came from 
rhe exploirs of the brave young aviators 
who carried the battle to the enemy's 
doorstep. Tho Naval Air War in Viel• 
nam, by Peter Mersky and Norman 
Folmar, graphically tells the story of the 
many Navy and Marine Corps pilots 
who rode into battle wielding the most 
sophisdcaced weapons in the history of 
warfare. Ir is noteworthy chat the 
authors did not faU victim to the disease 
sometimes known as "fighter�itis"; they 
also chronicle brilliantly the contribu­
tions of reconnaissance and patrol 
aircraft that performed equally vital if 
less glamorous tasks during Amedca's 
longest war. Folmar, winner of the 
Navy League of the United States Alfred 
Thayer Mahan Award for Literary 
Achievement, is best known for his 
highly respected editing of the U.S. 
section of Jane's Fighting Ships. 
He is joined by Peter B. Mersky, a 
former naval aviator and air intelligence 
officer, io a venture that gives the first 
full account of naval air warfare during 
the Vietnam era. 
The book is introduced by V. Adm 
W.L. McDonald, Deputy Chiefof Naval
Operations (Air Warfare), who de­
scribes it as
,he most complete chronicle of rhe 
air war in Vier Nam yer to be 
published, This book offers a vivid 
description of what that war was to 
the warrior in the sky and how he 
performed. 
Drawing from the personal experi­
ences of the pilots themselves ( over 50 
of whom are mentioned by name), the 
authors tell of the heartbreaking frustra• 
tion generated by the incredibly strict 
constraints placed on their actions by 
political leaders seeking co limit the war 
to a set of unrealistic parameters. These 
restrictions were reminiscent of similar 
sanctions placed on pilots during che 
Korean war which aUowed them to 
bomb only the south end of Yalu River 
bridges, The authors cite many ex­
amples of the impact of such restric� 
tions: 
The port of Cam Pha, an important 
North Vietnamese coal depot, 
could not be attacked when there 
were any foreign ships in the 
harbor. Naturally the North took 
advantage of this ruling and it was 
a rare day when a foreign ship was 
not tied up to a pier at Cam Pha. 
The frustration of the men who 
risked their lives daily entering the 
intense corridors of flak and 
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SAMS can be imagined, as they 
fought not only the enemy on the 
ground, but also the so�called rules 
of engagement laid down by their 
government. Even when ships in 
harbors opened up with 37-mm 
fire, the Navy pilots were strictly 
admonished nm to fire back, 
The Naval Air War in Vietnam 
depicts accurately a wide spectrum or air 
operations ranging from massive raids 
against the North to lonely patrol 
flights along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
The authors detail the use of dozens of 
aircraft types from the last of the Navy's 
piston-engine attack planes. the A-IH 
Skyraider, to the F-14A Tomcats, which 
provided fighter cover during Operation 
Frequent Wind, the final evacuation of 
Saigon. They even provide a glimpse of 
such exotic craft as the Patrol Afr 
Cushion Vehicles (PACV) th.tt were 
described as "one-third airplane. one� 
third helicopter, and one-third boat" 
and the SP-5B Marlin, the last flying 
boats used operationally by the U.S. 
Navy. 
This oucstanding book is filled with 
more than 200 photographs and charts, 
and while it is a "must" for every 
aviator's bookshelf, it will be enjoyed 
equally by readers wirh their feet on the 
ground but their hearts in the clouds. 
JOHN E. JACKSON 
J.ieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Rausa, Rosario. Gold Wings, BJ,,, Sea: 
A Na11al Avialor's S1ory. Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1980. 200pp. 
$15.95 
Flying of any kind seems to hold a 
general attraction for people but naval 
aviation has its own special mystique 
centered on the aircraft carrier and its 
around-the-dock flight operations. 
Carrier ops successfulJy made the transi­
tion from prop-driven to jet aircraft 11 
couple of decades ago, an era of transi .. 
tion which this book bridges. 
Professional Reading 81 
The author, a reserve nava) captain, 
completed naval flight training in the 
late 1950s and served several tours on 
board the Forrestal as an AD (later A-I 
Skyraider) pilot. Nearly two-thirds of 
the book deals with his exploits as a 
student pilot and vignetces of Hfe as an 
operational aircrew on duty in the 
Mediterranean. The last third of the 
book relaces Rausa's experiences during 
a combat tour with the A-1 aboard the 
Coral Sea during the Southeast Asia 
conflict. 
This book does not break any iiew 
ground in the trials and tribulations of 
learning to fly or life as a military pilot. 
Many of the stories about a particular 
flight or shipboard per sonality are 
loosely tjed together with no connection 
to each other. For those who served 
with Captain Rausa, these scenes wiU 
probably prove both enjoyable a nd 
memorable, 
The author's role as the pilot of a 
redprocaring airpJane on board a predom� 
inandy jet-equipped carrier provides a 
different insight into a world that is 
virtually gone. The detaiJs of intermin­
able nine-hour low-level strike missions 
leave the reader thankful for present­
day cruise speeds. There is a certain 
glamour, howevert to an aircraft whose 
speed allows the pilot time to think. 
Gold Wings, Blue Sea is well-written 
but the interesting sections are too 
thinly scattered to be enjoyable. It is not 
a comprehensive look at carrier aviation 
but it is the scory of the years whkh 
made up so much of one naval aviator's 
life. 
DON RlGHTMYllR 
Captain, U.S. Air Forc:e 
Sherrard, D.G. To Antarctica Wi1h the 
Royal Navy, New York: Vantage 
Press, 1981. 122pp. $7.95 
David Sherrard and I served together 
in the mid�60s. He was at times 
extremely amusing, and at times. exasper .. 
adng. 1 feel he was born too late; he 
might have done well in submarines in 
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